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FRENCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ORIGIN




Individuals act more or less simultaneously as economic agents, citizens,
and participants in civil society. Their interactions and their ways of fulfilling
these roles take many forms. Not all of them can be said to be self-organizing,
yet in several instances patterns of organization emerge spontaneously without
being deliberately designed. Of course, the market economy—or “catallaxy,” as
F. A. Hayek called it—remains the best example of such “spontaneous orders.”
But there are others. Gus diZerega (2000), for example, has identified science
and democracy as being similarly constituted by self-referential, self-organizing
(some authors prefer the term autopoietic) processes. In this paper I focus on
what I call the philanthropic order. By this I intend to refer not only to the
activities of philanthropic foundations and of individual donors but also more
broadly to a whole range of processes that allocate material and symbolic
resources through nonmarket mechanisms fuelled by more or less explicitly
altruistic motivations. Various phrases or terms have been used to describe part
of this, or something similar to what I have in mind: the voluntary or nonprofit
sector, “social capital,” and civil society more generally.
The philanthropic order complements the catallaxy by creating and
reproducing the social capital that is essential to the market process. Without
trust, for example, economic agents incur high transaction costs and
entrepreneurial initiative is thwarted by lack of funding and other obstacles. But
in other ways the philanthropic order rests on relationships and produces values
that are desired in and by themselves. Economic gains and, more broadly,
prudential goals rank high on most peoples’ agendas, but they certainly do not
exclude others that are often even more compelling, such as seeking affection or
Dobuzinskis, Laurent. 2009. French Perspective on the Origin and Logic of the “Philanthropic Order”:
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self-regard, meeting ethical obligations, etc. Within the nebulous noneconomic
sphere, the giving and receiving of gifts creates networks that enable individuals
to interact in meaningful ways with friends and neighbors, but also—and this is
a rather recent development—with strangers.1 These ties give rise to a “civil
society” which exists more or less precariously between the commercial sphere
and the state.
How such networks, linking individuals, groups, and organizations by
means of diffuse cultural norms, emerge and compete with or complement the
market order is a question that looms large in French social and economic
thought. In fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that while the
Scottish Enlightenment invented the paradigm of the market as a spontaneous
order and Austrian economics perfected it, the French—or, at any rate, a certain
current of progressive liberalism distinct from the more constructivist tradition
that Hayek so relentlessly criticized, from Montesquieu, Emile Durkheim, and
Marcel Mauss to Serge-Christophe Kolm (to mention only a few standard-bearers
within that current2)—have deepened the idea of civil society as a spontaneous
order emerging from nonmarket interactions involving honor (“noblesse
oblige”), gift-giving, solidarity, and, generally, nonutilitarian values and
standards of judgment. This paradigm is not radically anti-statist, but it treats
the state in an instrumentalist or pragmatic manner, granting it no more powers
or responsibilities than are needed to resolve vexing collective action problems
such as alleviating poverty and remedying severe economic inequalities,
provided that these goals are subject to philosophical and constitutional
constraints intended to preserve liberty and private property.
The exploration of all the origins and ramifications of this admittedly rather
nebulous vision (which probably does not qualify as a fully developed
“paradigm”) is too vast a topic to be dealt with exhaustively here. My goal is
more limited: to critically analyze contributions made by two French theorists to
the discussion of gift-giving and altruism. They are, respectively, the early
twentieth-century social theorist Marcel Mauss and the contemporary economist
and philosopher Serge Kolm. References to other (mostly French or
francophone) authors are unavoidable, but there are good reasons to focus on
these two thinkers. A reading of Mauss’s writings on gifts and their social
significance is a sine qua non first step in any investigation of the philanthropic
order. As Philip Mirowski (2001, 438) put it, “[i]n economic anthropology, all
roads to the gift lead back to Marcel Mauss.” But precisely because Mauss’s
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seminal The Gift has been so often quoted and put to all kinds of uses, it is
necessary to try to recover some of the subtleties of his thought that are frequently
ignored. (There is a tendency to summarize his thesis as simply being that the gift
economy is the functional equivalent of the market economy for premodern
societies.) Kolm’s rather prolific reflections on altruism and reciprocity offer very
valuable insights from an economic perspective on the philanthropic order (1982;
1996; 2000a; 2000b; 2005; 2006). Economics is admittedly not the only nor
perhaps even the most relevant perspective on the philanthropic order, since
phenomena such as gift-giving entail a broad range of motivations and effects,
many of which have little to do with rational calculations. Nevertheless, in
addition to the economics of gift-giving being a crucial dimension of this process,
Kolm’s original and profound vision—normatively guided by Buddhist ethics—
provides one of the best examples of recent efforts on the part of many economists
to move beyond conventional models.
While in broad terms these authors work within a spontaneous order
paradigm, their interpretation of what that means differs significantly from the
more libertarian overtones of the Hayekian version. In fact they occasionally
deviate from the values that inform the latter at some critical junctures. Some of
these deviations are open to criticism, while others may be worth looking into
in order to reach a less reductionist understanding of spontaneous orders in all
their forms. In Mauss’s case an analysis of gift-giving in “archaic societies”
which strongly evokes the notion of an invisible hand producing societal peace
out of the gift-giving initiatives undertaken by individuals on their own is
followed by an exaggeratedly and somewhat naive “constructivist” proposal for
adapting such practices to modern conditions. As for Kolm’s outlook, it can be
described as offering a left-libertarian perspective, albeit a quite idiosyncratic
and original one. He starts from an axiomatic acceptance of the primacy of
liberty, but his unrelenting quest for ways of correcting what he regards as
unjustifiable inequalities3 leads him to advocate critical positions that deserve to
be carefully examined.
The Maussian Gift: A Societal Archetype
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of Mauss’s ([1925]
1966) essay on gift-giving. While not based on his own field research, this
curious work provides a wealth of information, most of which is scientifically
sound even by today’s standards, on practices ranging from those of the Haida
118. . . C O N V E R S A T I O N S O N P H I L A N T H R O P Y
D o b u z i n s k i s
and Kwakiult peoples in the American Northwest to those of the inhabitants of
Polynesian islands, as well as social and legal norms in the Indo-European
world, including India, ancient Rome, and modern Europe. Mauss never provided
a formal definition of gifts, but one gets the impression from the opening pages
that he was concerned with services rendered through acts of reciprocal
generosity. To describe these transactions—which take the form of gifts but serve
more important functions than what modern individuals understand by that
term—Mauss used the French word prestations. This term is difficult to translate.
The first published English translation of The Gift reused “prestation,” which not
only is rarely used in English but, when it is, evokes a monetary exchange, which
is not necessarily the case in French. A more recent translation redefines these
interactions as “total services,” in light of their functionality in the context of the
“total social phenomena” or “total social facts” Mauss claimed he was
uncovering. (This phrase, incidentally, should not be read as a claim that he had
constructed an all-encompassing theory of a preordained totality called society
that would stand above individuals and determine their behavior; instead it
should be read as an allusion to the multidimensional character of social
interactions4 and the need to remain attentive to the contexts within which they
take place. See Gofman 1998.) These “total services” appear to be strangely
paradoxical: “Among all these very complex themes and this multiplicity of social
‘things’ that are in a state of flux, we seek here to study only one characteristic—
one that goes deep but is isolated: the so to speak voluntary character of these
total services, apparently free and disinterested but nevertheless constrained and
self-interested” (Mauss [1925] 1990, 4).
More specifically, at the core of Mauss’s theory of the gift is a triangular
relationship constituting three interdependent “obligations”5: to give, to receive,
and to reciprocate. Many people in North America are familiar with the
“potlatch” ritual practiced by the aboriginal people of the northern Pacific coast,
in which vast amounts of food and other goods are periodically given away by
families to other families within the “tribe” or beyond. This is one of the
examples to which Mauss comes back repeatedly to illustrate this triple
obligation. “One has no right to refuse a gift, or to refuse to attend the potlatch”
(52), he writes, and the obligation to repay lies at the very core of this
institution, although that obligation is veiled behind the delay before the
repayment is enacted.
V o l u m e V I 2 0 0 9 . . . 119
“ p h i l a n t h r o p i c o r d e r ”
In contrast to the potlatch, we tend to think of gifts today as being typically
disinterested acts. To give in such a way that we make it known that we expect
something in return spoils the act of giving and is regarded as hypocritical. This
is true not only in our relationships with our family and friends but also
regarding contributions to philanthropic causes. It is not uncommon for donors
to request anonymity, and when this is done it is generally considered to be a
highly moral act. (However, as Lior Jacob Strahilevitz points out (2007),
anonymous gifts are more likely to be offered when there is “excess capacity”;
donors are more likely to want recognition when giving is very onerous.)
A reading of Mauss’s take on this question that has immediate appeal but
which is actually somewhat simplistic (more about this below) is to conclude
that he showed that “archaic” societies differ fundamentally from modern ones
in that the former practice reciprocal gift-giving while in the latter gifts have
become disinterested; in other words, the paradox cited above is a paradox only
for modern observers. Or to sharpen this contrast, one could say that now that
commercial exchanges have become the most common form of allocating goods
and services, gifts exist only at the margin of the market economy and derive
their significance precisely from the fact that they are disinterested, in contrast
to premodern societies in which the “gift economy” prevailed. Thus some
“interests” have to be accommodated by the gift economy because they cannot
be accommodated outside of it.
There are two ways in which this somewhat facile interpretation of the
Maussian gift needs to be qualified. They both point toward a deep connection
between the rituals that surround gift-giving, on the one hand, and the very idea
of spontaneous order. The first is that Mauss showed that the “prestations” or
services exchanged were “total” in the sense that they were not strictly economic
but also had a symbolic and spiritual significance. The second, and related,
qualification, which has been highlighted by Jonathan Parry (1986), invokes
religion, and more specifically the unique character of religions that promise
salvation in an afterlife. In societies where such religious beliefs prevail, “pure”
gifts are valued as means of ensuring salvation (for example, Jesus’s saying
about giving alms, “let not thy left hand know about what thy right hand doeth”
in Matthew 6:3); by “pure” gifts I mean those that do not require reciprocation,
at least not in this world. Some indirect benefits, however, are promised to
righteous donors, for instance through the law of danadharma (the Hindu law
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of religious gifts) or in Christianity, especially in Calvinism, where the
benefactor’s disposition to give generously is a confirmation to him- or herself
of having received the gift of grace.
Mauss was aware of the difference between animist premodern societies
and either premodern or modern societies that have a belief in salvation
through good deeds. He was alerted to it by his erudite knowledge of Hinduism,
where it is seen as dangerous for Brahmans to receive gifts because giving to
them is a way to cast away the donor’s sins (Mauss [1925] 1990, 70-77; Parry
1986, 459-463). However, this poses a problem for him (albeit one that he did
not fully realize, at least according to Parry) insofar as his explanation of the
deeper structure of gift-giving grants a good deal of importance to the Maori
notion of the hau, the “spirit” of the object being given, which must return in
the form of a counter-gift. Parry notes the contrast between religions in which
the divine is immanent in nature or human experience and those where the
divine assumes a transcendent character: “[w]here we have the ‘spirit’
reciprocity is denied; where there is reciprocity there is not much evidence of
‘spirit’” (1986, 463). Thus it may well be that we ought to reverse our
commonsense view of the causal link between the commercial and
noncommercial spheres. Instead of the latter being a residue left when the
former has overtaken the social space, Parry claims that Christian civilization,
where “the ideology of the pure gift” arguably took the most universalistic
expression, has tended to “promote and entrench the ideological elaboration of
a domain in which self-interest is supreme.” In other words, the commercial
and noncommercial spheres of social life are tied in a close dialectical
relationship which does indeed survive even in our more secular times. At least
conceptually, at the level of collective representations, the commercial and the
philanthropic order are mirror images that serve to define each other.
An exegesis of the preceding remarks applied to spontaneous order could be
developed along two lines. The first, with respect to Parry’s thesis, explicitly
refers to divine providence: it is divine providence that guides the invisible hand
taking from believers in this world and giving them back their due not only in
eternal life but also in this world in the benefits of a clear conscience and so on.
On the other hand, in the premodern cultures upon which Mauss focused most
of his efforts, the invisible hand is moved by the “spirit” of the gift, which makes
it circulate among the members of the group. It was especially in these cultures
that the gift economy was most developed, because in premodern societies
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where there existed a polar opposition between pure gifts and commercial
transactions the exchange of reciprocal gifts was not coterminous with the
economic sphere as a whole. Even in these societies, however, the categories had
a tendency to overlap, and in any event reciprocity played a larger part than it
does today because many markets (e.g., markets for services) did not exist. In
all these cases, however, more or less “pure” gifts were not only a way of
allocating economic resources but also were parts of religious rituals and duties
as well as political relationships. In other words, gifts had a foundational role:
they helped to cement sociopolitical networks that sustained more or less sizable
or extended communities. As Mary Douglas notes, Mauss’s genius was to
recognize that in the “archaic” societies he studied the gift economy was both
the product of spontaneous collaboration and something more than a merely
economic process:
He also discovered a mechanism by which individual interests
combine to make a social system, without engaging in market
exchange. This is an enormous development beyond Durkheim’s idea
of solidarity based on collective representations. The gift cycle echoes
Adam Smith’s invisible hand: gift complements market as far as it
operates where the latter is absent. Like the market it supplies each
individual with personal incentives for collaborating in the pattern of
exchanges. Gifts are given in a context of public drama, with nothing
secret about them. . . . In operating a gift system a people are more
aware of what they are doing, as shown by the sacralization of their
institutions of giving (1990, xviii).
One of the reasons exchanging gifts can become a sacred moment is that gift-
giving brings peace, both within the community or association of clans (“the tribe”)
and among tribes, for example when chiefs meet and when tribal feasts take place
among rival groups (Mauss [1925] 1990, 37, 104-107). In Jacques Godbout’s words,
the Maussian gift is “a mode of transforming conflict into alliance” (1998, ix). This
is obviously a vitally important political dimension of the act of gift-giving, which
brings to light why Mauss considers it to be a “total prestation.” Nonetheless,
Mauss is not talking about the social “totality” acting as a transcendent unity but
about the acts of identifiable individuals (chiefs, clan patriarchs, and so on). In
sum, there are interesting parallels between Mauss’s paradigm and Hayek’s idea of
spontaneous order as originally defined by Adam Ferguson as something that is the
outcome of human action but not of human design.
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The Continued Relevance of the Maussian Paradigm
In the final and arguably rather confusing chapter of his essay, Mauss
attempts to show that gift-giving remains an important facet of modern societies.6
He begins by alluding to a few customs he observed in rural France, which he
offers as evidence that reciprocal gift-giving involving a whole village continued
to be a way of life, and he notes that in his lifetime there were still customs
indicating the belief that things have personalities (as seen, for example, in rituals
performed in Lorraine when cattle was sold). He then moves on to argue that
modern societies must find ways to “return” to the habit of noblesse oblige: “As
is happening in English-speaking countries and so many other contemporary
societies . . . the rich must come back to considering themselves—freely and also
by obligation—as the financial guardians of their fellow citizens. . . . [T]here
must be more care for the individual, his health, his education (which is
moreover a profitable investment), his family and their future” ([1925] 1990, 88).
The way to implement these goals, in his view, was through social
legislation. He believed that the responsibility for the circulation of wealth in
society had fallen on the state. In fairness, Mauss showed a marked preference
for “various systems of financial sharing within the framework of workers’
unions or professional associations” (Silber 1998, 136), and he mentioned
approvingly the rather paternalistic practice of “family funds” set up by
employers. Nonetheless, he was clearly under the impression that centralized
state provision of social services was the most plausible way of bringing back
the ethics of the gift. On closer examination, neither his idea that an emphasis
on gift-giving implies a “return” to a long-gone past nor his views on how the
circulation of wealth is or ought to be carried out in modern societies stand up
to critical scrutiny, as explained below.
Gifts Everywhere . . .
Some analysts insist that the gift continues to have a haunting presence in
today’s consumer society. While not at the forefront of socioeconomic discourse
or always very evident in institutional rules and practices, the “ghost of the gift”
stirs powerful emotions and makes us realize that something is missing in our
everyday lives, they argue (Callari 2002; Derrida 1992; Kenway et al. 2006). The
gift haunts us, as it were, because we sense that in at least some cases it could
still be an alternative to market exchanges but is often unspoken,
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unacknowledged, and confined to the domestic sphere. The gift is perplexing
because we do not always know how to assess its value: it is located partly
within the market economy, where gifts are purchased and their price is
sometimes all that matters to the receiver, but also outside of it insofar as they
are meant to cement relationships that are not commercial by definition. Market
prices are often a poor indication of the true meaning of a gift, and its “use
value” is frequently negligible (gifts offered or received with much joy may in
practice be redundant or possibly even something of a nuisance). Philip
Mirowski (2001) in fact argues that the gift hints at what is deficient in the
prevalent value regime, using an analogy with Gödel’s paradox: something that
can be stated within the system (in this case, the market-based value principle)
cannot be computed or proven within it; thus gifts which are free (something for
nothing) can be thought of outside the system but “cannot be adequately
encompassed within it” (455).
These are intriguing perspectives on what is admittedly something of a
mystery: the obvious anomaly of gift-giving in a world where market
transactions are more efficient. But it would be a mistake to think of the gift only
as a paradox or a ghost, let alone “an impossibility” (Derrida 1992). There are
two ways of undermining the thesis that we can only perceive the shadows of
an ancient tradition of gift-giving and sharing. The first relies on a descriptive
account of contemporary socioeconomic practices and emerging trends. This is
the path I follow next. The second consists of a more abstract discussion of
theoretical innovations that are bringing concepts such as altruism, reciprocity,
and fairness back into the discourse of economics. This is the path I follow later,
in the section titled “Serge Kolm on the Mechanisms Sustaining the
Philanthropic Order.”
Casting a more prosaic look at social realities in contemporary developed
societies, Godbout (1998, 6) brings up a myriad of anecdotal but telling
examples that lead him to declare “the gift is everywhere.” Much of what is
given in the form of personal gifts, hospitality, time commitments, and so on has
a more symbolic value than a monetary one, and what is measurable in theory
is not necessarily recorded in official statistics. Nevertheless, even if it only
represents the proverbial “tip of the iceberg,” what is known about charitable
contributions shows that the phenomenon is far from negligible. For example
(see Schuyt 2008), in ten European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
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Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK), charitable
donations by households, foundations, and corporations amounted to about 0.88
percent of GDP between 1995 and 2005 (and rose at a very slow pace during that
period). That percentage is higher—about double—in the United States.
Donations to charities in the United States increased significantly in recent years,
from 1.5 percent of personal income in 1995 to 2.1 percent in 2001 (Andreoni
2006, 1207), and already more than ten years ago the voluntary sector accounted
for 4 percent of employment in Great Britain and 7 percent in the United States
(Offner 1997, 450). In Canada alone the voluntary sector employed about
900,000 people at the turn of the millennium, equivalent to the total
employment in the provinces of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick, and more than in construction and mining combined (McMullen and
Schellenberg 2002). Paralleling these trends, the growth of the scholarly
literature on philanthropy, altruism, “social capital,” and related topics in
economics, sociology, and other social scientific disciplines has been quite
impressive. New journals have appeared (such as Conversations on Philanthropy
and Chronicle of Philanthropy), and new programs have been created (such as
the University of Bologna’s Master’s Degree in International Studies in
Philanthropy and Social Entrepreneurship).
The most intriguing and portentous trend at work today, however, stems
from the technological revolution in communications. The so-called Digital Age
opens opportunities for a wide range of new nonmarket exchanges. Already a
vast array of goods (such as software, music, newspapers, and magazines) is
offered for free on the Internet. It is not just the fact that more products are made
freely available that deserves attention; equally interesting is the emergence of
new social behaviors and motivations. As Jane Kenway et al. (2006, 72) remark,
“The notion of Open Access, particularly the push toward OA research literature,
demonstrates key features of a gift economy. In this system, if knowledge is used
then its use must also be repaid, or returned to the site of circulation (i.e. go
back into e-print repository and open access journals).”
Yochai Benkler (2006) picks up on similar observations to propose a bold and
arguably slightly too optimistic vision of a future transformed by new modes of
“social production.” By that he means dispersed production activities largely
under the control of individuals, as opposed to centralized organizations, taking
place outside of conventional markets or state institutions. To some extent these
activities already have displaced current economic structures, and Benkler
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strongly argues that they will continue to do so. They also promise to increase
individual freedom and opportunities for meaningful social and political
engagement while opening up new avenues for alleviating some of the disparities
that plague relations between the developing and the developed worlds.
Benkler’s comprehensive and thorough analysis of the “New Information
Economy” bears not only on the economics of social production but also on the
attitudinal and behavioral factors undergirding it. These are already having a
profound impact on culture and politics. Clearly, as Benkler notes, “the relative
economic role of sharing changes with technology” (2006, 121).7 The old
industrial structure built on centralized commercial organizations “shunted
sharing” (2006, 121), he observes. However, now that many of the barriers have
been removed, sharing can be expected to flourish if Benkler is correct in
believing that sharing expresses an irrepressible aspect of human nature. (It is
important to acknowledge, however, that people are more likely to share or
donate time than money. See Liu and Aaker 2008.) This trend is facilitated by
the fact that the capital costs faced by individuals who wish to produce and
exchange knowledge or cultural artifacts on their own or in cooperation with
others have decreased significantly, to the point of becoming negligible. (This
may not be true in the poorest regions of the world, however.) This trend will
not cause the market economy to collapse, but incumbent market-based firms
now face unprecedented challenges. Transaction cost theory, however, suggests
that new strategies of symbiotic coexistence between social production and the
most innovative firms will arise. Because information is simultaneously both an
output and an input that can be reused by others for their own purposes, some
firms already anchored in the information economy could benefit from using free
inputs of superior quality applicable to new business operations.8 IBM, for
example, uses the open source Linux operating system for its servers and has
refocused its entire business plan on serving these machines.
The new push to broaden the protection of intellectual property is clearly
Benkler’s bête noire.9 Information, he insists, is not like other goods. The more
freely it flows, the better off we all are, and technological developments make it
increasingly possible for it to flow freely. Thus he sees the development of a new
information economy as being dependent in large measure on a revisiting of the
old concept of the “commons” (2006, 63). This context would allow cooperation
to flourish among individuals seeking goals other than monetary rewards, freely
producing information and using it to innovate. In the political realm, the
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emergence of a networked public sphere has already enhanced the freedom of
individuals to participate in the political process, which became very apparent in
the recent presidential campaign in the United States and also elsewhere.10 Benkler
fervently hopes that the new technologies will continue to strengthen civil society,
and that the state, while still indispensable in some respects, will become less and
less relevant to citizens freely cooperating on a range of civic and political projects.
The liberal “public sphere” he describes is a forum for free discussion in which
yesterday’s mass media will be less and less able to set the agenda.
This is an appealing vision, and Benkler rather convincingly refutes some of
the earlier criticisms provoked by more utopian accounts of the digital future.
For instance, he argues that the specter of a new Tower of Babel can be avoided
by establishing accreditation filters, as several popular websites have done
already. His optimism, however, obscures some of the obvious problems that
may arise when vested interests and political groups find it necessary to launch
a counterattack. Repressive regimes such as the government of China seem to
have been more successful at that than was expected at the dawn of the Digital
Age. It is not entirely clear, either, that the public at large, as distinct from highly
motivated activists, will take ownership of this networked public sphere in their
everyday lives. Nonetheless, Benkler has shown that in addition to the continued
presence of a philanthropic impulse, new and powerful technological
developments give us reasons to doubt that Mauss correctly diagnosed the
passing of the world of the gift. I now turn to a critique of Mauss’s insistence
that state-centered social policy was the only way to reinvent it.
But No Gifts from the State
Mauss’s idea that giving has been transmogrified into the institution of the
welfare state in modern times must be taken with a huge grain of salt. While
strict libertarians no doubt disagree with the following, there are good reasons
to believe that the state has a responsibility to ensure that no one falls below a
certain level of income, and that the remedial measures can take the form of
universal grants (a basic income scheme). It is probably also true that for some
forms of insurance, in particular health insurance, state funding (albeit not
necessarily management and delivery) yields efficiencies of scale. In these
instances, state intervention provides viable solutions to collective action
problems (inherent in the free rider’s tendency to give only if everyone else does
so too, which might actually be motivated by an evolutionary sense of fairness).
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I will return to this point in the next section. To posit, however, as Mauss did,
that the only way for modern people to recover the social bonds he observed in
archaic societies is to entrust the state with the responsibility of coordinating
gift-giving is a very different and unwarranted assertion.
As Godbout (1998, ch. 3) remarks, welfare state programs designed to meet
a seemingly never-ending stream of demands, and the way in which they are
implemented, differ from the Maussian gift in two important respects. First, they
never encompass the whole gift-giving cycle of giving, receiving, and
reciprocating. In a few rather exceptional instances, such as blood and organ
donations, the interrupted cycle begins with a genuine gift, but because donors
and recipients are kept apart by strict rules (at least in the case of blood
donations), there is no possibility of reciprocation. As for Titmuss’s much-
discussed argument that blood donations are not only more efficient than
commercial alternatives but also serve as a reinforcing mechanism upholding
feelings of solidarity upon which the welfare state is based, Godbout provides
rather convincing counterarguments. The blood scandals that rocked the medical
community in France and Canada in the early 1990s show that state
administrators sometimes pursue objectives that run counter to the interests of
the patients. And regarding the solidarity argument, Godbout notes that the
Swedes’ strong social democratic traditions have not prevented them from
developing a commercial blood distribution system. Nonetheless, if blood
donations provide an example of a truncated cycle that begins with a gift, the
more common pattern is that of a truncated cycle that ends with a gift (a service
of payment) but begins with the exact opposite, namely, taxes.
This point is well taken, since by definition taxes are not voluntary
contributions. It could be argued, however, that although taxes are paid
reluctantly and tax evasion can never be ruled out, there is quasi-unanimity
about the need to contribute some resources to collective action. In fact, outside
of the United States political parties gain little electoral advantage from
promising tax cuts even if it is easy to argue that the growth of the welfare state
has led to increases in taxes that go well beyond the hypothetical level that
practically all citizens would consider to be the minimum contribution they are
prepared to make to ensure that all their fellow citizens are guaranteed some
degree of protection against poverty, poor health, and so on. All the same, taxes
are not equivalent to gifts.
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The other line of cleavage between the world of the gift and the welfare
state becomes clear when one compares the way in which charitable
organizations and state agencies deliver services to their clients. At the
individual level, relationships between volunteers and the people they help are
more personal and are experienced usually as expressions of gifts, whereas the
professionalism of state agents precludes this sort of closeness. (This is not to
say that professional standards are not desirable, for they often guarantee a
higher level of service, but there is a qualitative tradeoff nevertheless.) And at
the systemic level, Godbout (1998, 60) aptly notes that the state is rarely
“content just to transfer money” and that when it assumes the role of dispensing
services, it “often seeks either to supplant the primary networks or to make use
of them in order to achieve its objectives. Let us not forget that, unlike the
marketplace, the state may legitimately define collective needs, but it is much
more difficult for it to recognize individual preferences. It therefore has a doubly
‘good’ reason to constantly strive to define people’s ‘real’ needs in their stead.”
The discussion so far has hinted at the existence of a self-organizing
philanthropic order emerging from a myriad of personal gift-giving initiatives
and a sense of indebtedness to others, be they close family members or
strangers. But it is somewhat difficult to make sense of the relation that these
formal and informal networks of communication, production, and distribution
might have with either the market economy or the state. One sometimes gets the
impression that the philanthropic order provides a foundation for these other
systems, while at other times it appears to exist in an antagonistic relation with
them. It is also sometimes presented as if it were permeating the social fabric
and helping individuals give meaning to their lives, and yet is somehow ignored
or downplayed. Sociological analysis is both illuminating and limiting in this
regard; it offers a panoply of interpretations that open up intriguing perspectives,
but it cannot provide causal models that help to explain the mechanisms that
sustain and reproduce the voluntary sector and the concrete effects of
individuals’ decisions to give time or money in trying to help others. That kind
of analysis would be useful to policymakers who have to decide how they could
or should support the growth of that sector either directly or indirectly (such as
by removing barriers to the operations of philanthropic institutions).
Toward that end I now turn to the pioneering work of the French economist
Serge Kolm, whose investigations of the economics of giving and altruism have
cleared a field that is now being explored by many others. Although Kolm and
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the economists who have taken up his challenge (see, for example, Gérard-Varet et
al. 2000; Kolm et al. 2006) of considering gift-giving a worthy subject of economic
analysis often end up revisiting and commenting on the more sociological and
philosophical themes briefly sketched out above, their contributions bring to light
parallels between the mechanisms at work in premodern societies and processes
constitutive of modern market economies. At the same time they underline the
limitations of conventional economic models. These limitations and biases must be
overcome in order to better reflect the complex reality of the choices made by
economic actors. New directions in economic research (including behavioral
economics and even more recently, “neuroeconomics”11) have brought attention to
the need for a serious rethinking of economic rationality, and Kolm’s pioneering
work adds much depth to these explorations.
Serge Kolm on the Mechanisms Sustaining the Philanthropic Order
Seeking to combine and harmonize many of the insights Adam Smith
treated separately in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations,
Serge Kolm recently embarked on a twofold research project after many years of
writing on inequality and economic justice (see Kolm 2005).12 On the one hand,
using the formal language of mathematics and neoclassical microeconomics he
has labored to stress the relevance of the economists’ toolkit for the analysis of
the world of the gift, which so far has been mostly the province of sociologists
and anthropologists. (Kolm is obviously aware of Mauss’s work but only
occasionally cites it.) On the other hand, in part because of an abiding interest
in and deep commitment to Buddhist psychology and ethics (see Kolm 1982), he
has tirelessly argued for a need to “introduce many new and crucial aspects”
into economics in order to balance the unwarranted emphasis on “self-interested
market exchanges.” He argues that the “motivations considered will have to be
much more varied, complex and subtle (and interesting) than only strict self-
interest” (2000a, 3). More specifically, he writes, one of the consequences of
reciprocity “is that both the structure of preferences and the concepts of
solutions of interaction (in the sense of game theory) will have to be more
complex and richer. Reciprocitarian interaction elicits new concepts of solutions
and new meanings for old ones, as it entails sentiments of fairness, equity,
balance, respect for others, moral indebtedness, ‘proper’ behavior, duty, norm
following, care for image building, benevolence, altruism and so on, along with
self-interest” (4).13
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In the previous section I showed that even if it sometimes makes sense to
speak of a “gift economy,” what Godbout calls “the world of the gift”
encompasses a far broader range of phenomena and follows its own logic, one
that conventional economic models fail to accommodate. However, Mauss and
many of his followers err in their belief that these differences support the thesis
that markets and the world of the gift have always been—or should be
reinvented as—antagonistic paradigms, and that the gift economy is preferable
because it operates on the basis of more humane and morally defensible
principles. (The same error has also been committed by Karl Polanyi and those
who have uncritically adopted his hypothesis of the “embedded economy”; even
if one were to concede that anthropology provides examples of economic
phenomena that were over-determined by cultural and other societal factors, this
status quo ante is hardly something that can be recreated at will.) Although
distinct and autonomous, these two forms of spontaneous order communicate
with each other and even overlap in ways it is crucial to understand. To put it
differently, there are mechanisms that are common to both and operate in
comparable ways, even if they do not produce the same effects.
This is something that Serge Kolm has analyzed in a rigorous and perceptive
manner. His writings on gift-giving illuminate these mechanisms without
attempting to reduce one domain to the other. Kolm manages to bring to light both
the economic dimension of the world of the gift and the extent to which economic
exchanges are themselves dependent on altruism. His works underline the
complexity of these paradoxical relationships of codetermination. It would be futile
to deny that giving is often inspired by genuine generosity, but Kolm points out that
the variety of forms of gift-giving is “bewildering” and that often gifts are provided
with very different aims, and sometimes strictly opposite ones. They range from the
most generous sacrifice to being the instrument of social sentiments and relations
among the most odious, in passing by the plain service of the giver’s self-interest.
They also range from the most spontaneous . . . to resulting from the most elaborate
pondering and strategies. They are both the proof of sincerity and the classical
vector of hypocrisy and treacherous lies (2006, 19).
It is not surprising that the experience of living in societies where gift-giving
is not the dominant norm conditions many people to be selfishly generous, as it
were. As an economist, Kolm has no difficulty tracking relevant instances. These
include gifts offered in such a manner that (a) their effects overcompensate for the
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cost of the gift itself, (b) the gift conveys information that the receiver can use to
benefit the giver, (c) the gift is meant to trick a generous person into reciprocating,
or (d) the social effects of the gift (for example, in imparting a reputation for
generosity) are its primary motivation (Kolm 2000a, 11; see also Kaufman 1991;
Offner 1997). But even gifts offered for self-centered reasons can generate a
sequence of reciprocal interactions that evolve into deeper interpersonal or social
relationships. Trust is usually built in that way, for example.
This does not mean, however, that we should hold a Hobbesian view of
human nature. Although individuals are autonomous agents who should be
guaranteed the freedom to choose how to use the resources at their disposal—
Kolm call this “process freedom” (2005)—their freedom is conditional on many
tacit social skills. As Kolm puts it, “The most important effect of altruism is
probably the respect of other persons and their rights and properties, which
could not sufficiently and well be secured only by self-defense and the police.
This permits peace, social freedom defined by this respect—it is the basic social
ethics of our societies. . . . This respect is in particular a condition of a working
market system” (2006, 6). Thus he stresses that “economics, markets and
exchange, when carefully analyzed reveal the essential role of motives that are
not self-interested” (19). As a result, “many relations of market, exchange,
agreement, and cooperation thrive in spite of the presence of classical causes of
market failures which should have inhibited them, thanks to the role of various
moral conducts such as honesty, truth telling, promise keeping, fairness,
reciprocity, trust and trustworthiness, respect and benevolence” (20).
Where does this altruistic disposition come from, and how is it manifested?
There are several answers that yield somewhat different formal representations.14
Individuals may feel happier as the happiness of others increases or the welfare
of others improves, or as a certain level of income redistribution is achieved such
that no one is completely left out, as it were. These dispositions may be
hedonistic in reflecting feelings of empathy, or morally based in resting on a
certain conception of one’s duty to others. In practice these two distinct strands
are often intermingled. Kolm’s ethical outlook is more consequentialist than
deontological, since it clearly emphasizes the importance of happiness and
enlightened self-interest. (One’s concern for the welfare of others is less an
“imperative” than an integral part of one’s own happiness.) Nevertheless, Kolm
acknowledges and approves of the pervasive influence of everyday Kantianism
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in the culture of contemporary liberal societies: although people rarely act only
out of duty, deontological norms almost always enter into their decisions (Kolm
2000a, 3).
These altruistic dispositions are instrumental in several ways. For example,
Kolm echoes Benkler’s comments on the advantages of freely circulating
information in dealing with transaction costs. Moral imperatives and social
norms lead to “truth-telling, sincerity, and voluntary disclosure” (2006, 41).
More generally, enlightened self-interest (and, of course, the rarer manifestations
of “pure” altruism) helps to prevent or mitigate what would otherwise be
constantly recurring “market failures.” Echoing Smith but in reverse, he
concludes, “In improving social efficiency, these various non-strictly self-
interested conducts and motives often end up favoring the strict self-interest of
these actors. Then, disinterested conduct favors one’s strict interest in the end,
as if by a kind of immanent justice” (41).
Kolm diverges most significantly from the paradigm of an entirely
spontaneous (and private) philanthropic order; however, he stresses that state is
the best means of achieving income redistribution in favor of the most
disadvantaged members of society—something that he presumes everyone agrees
with, up to a point anyway. That is, he argues that for the purpose of “altruistic
joint giving,” which he treats as a public good, individuals can enter into an
implicit social contract involving a system of redistributive taxes.15 He maintains
that such a system “can be unanimously preferred to its absence” (16). In
addition, he argues, “a democratic political system normally secures Pareto
efficiency” in the sense that any program that is not efficient can be defeated by
a more efficient one; thus “efficiency and democracy require public aid” (17).
It is important, however, to remember that Kolm is concerned here only
with income redistribution. He offers no defense of the broader, more
qualitative, and more debatable programs that contemporary welfare states have
embarked upon in recent decades (such as employment equity, subsidized child
care, multiculturalism, and the provision of an ever-increasing list of
questionably termed “public goods”). Kolm is actually defending a point that
Milton Friedman and F. A. Hayek advanced in their advocacy of a minimum
income guaranteed by the state—an idea that had been recently reanimated in
some of Charles Murray’s work. As a left libertarian, Kolm is in favor of a more
generous redistribution than either Friedman or Hayek contemplated, and he has
provided a very sophisticated and elaborate scheme which he calls Equal Labor
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Income Equalization (ELIE), which seeks to compensate individuals for lack of
access to the resources they need to exercise the right to full self-ownership. The
essential point of this scheme (see Kolm 2005) is that there are efficiency gains
to be made from public implementation (such as through the tax system). After
that, what individuals decide to do with their income is up to them, and if that
income is high enough, the state can dispense with most of its other
administratively cumbersome programs.16
This being said, Kolm acknowledges that the philanthropic order extends far
beyond the simple goal of income distribution. He makes it quite clear that since
giving is a voluntary act and gifts, by definition, cannot be imposed, good social
relations based on gift-giving and reciprocity cannot be planned or enforced by
state action (2000c, 175).17 Moreover, he also acknowledges that even with
respect to income distribution there are reasons to be satisfied with private
charitable organizations or favor them, if one is motivated by goals other than
efficiency (such as demonstration effect, self-esteem, putative reciprocity, and a
belief in the Kantian imperative of universalization—“what if no one
contributed?”; see 2006, 106).
What is arguably missing from Kolm’s analysis is an account of the
institutional context within which good social relations based on altruism or
enlightened self-interest can flourish, and of the processes that give rise to such
institutions. This is perhaps why he tends to assume that the state is often the
best means of solving collective action problems even though technology and
Benkler’s “social production” could provide viable solutions either now or in the
near future. The question of how institutions emerge and the self-organizing
logic that best explains their evolution is a domain that, as I have shown, Mauss
explored very perceptively in the context of premodern societies. Hayek, for his
part, explored at length the same problem in the modern world; unfortunately,
he downplayed the importance of the altruistic feelings he described—
mistakenly, I believe—as a dispensable relic from a bygone era, a necessary step
in social evolution but one that is counterproductive in the “extended order” in
which the citizens of liberal democratic societies committed to free markets
happen to live (Hayek 1988, 19-21). While it is most certainly true that a
preference for fairness and conditional altruism evolved in the very early stages
of human development, I hope to have shown that Kolm’s propositions about
their continued importance in economic life are more convincing.
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Conclusion
French—or, perhaps more appropriately in today’s globalized world,
francophone—scholarship has made extraordinary contributions to the analysis
of a broad set of psychological and sociological phenomena which terms such as
altruism, reciprocity, gift-giving, and philanthropic institutions serve to describe
without fully evoking their richness and complexity. The strong anti-utilitarian
bias that runs through the French intellectual academic world accounts in large
measure for this fascination.
In focusing on Mauss and Kolm, I have dealt with arguably two of the most
prominent thinkers within that tradition, but it would be wrong to conclude that
they represent the sum total of what this tradition has to offer. Nonetheless, both
thinkers typify in their own ways the limitations of their respective disciplines and
the difficulties that even scholars who share certain values and common interests
face in trying to move beyond these limitations. Anthropologists may dabble at times
in discussing what they identified as the “gift economies” of nonwestern, premodern
societies, but on the whole their economic commentaries are rather amateurish, and
when it comes to the analysis of contemporary phenomena their prejudices against
market processes prevent them from understanding the many ways in which the
world of the gift and the Hayekian catallaxy potentially complement each other. And
although that sort of complementarity has been lucidly analyzed by Kolm and the
economists he has influenced in France and elsewhere, their microeconomic
methodology prevents them from dealing adequately with the relevance of their
subject matter to the construction of a macro-theory of the philanthropic order in all
its dimensions, including the historical and cultural aspects.
NOTES
1 The contrast between communitarian and cosmopolitan sympathy can be
traced back to the eighteenth century, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau
upholding the former and Immanuel Kant the latter, but the acceptance of
the ideology of universal human rights is a late twentieth-century
development.
2 One would also have to include the philosopher Alfred Fouillée (who was a
contemporary of Durkheim) and, in today’s context, the economist Alain
Caillé, the founder of the Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les Sciences
Sociales (MAUSS).
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3 His neglected article “The Optimal Production of Social Justice” (Kolm 1969)
proposed several key concepts that were later picked up by other authors to
whom they are often erroneously attributed and which triggered the
“considerable wave of inequality research that began in the 1970s”
(Lambert 2007, 213).
4 For example, Mauss asserts that the potlatch is simultaneously a religious and
an economic phenomenon that also touches on “social morphology and has
some of the attributes of a contract.”
5 Whether the gift creates “obligations” in the strict sense of something one is
literally obliged to do is challenged by Alain Testart (1998), who argues that
Mauss’s theory is like a Procrustean bed that ignores important differences
between very dissimilar forms of exchange. However, see note 4 above.
6 Mauss was writing in the early 1920s, so the term “modern” still applies,
although “contemporary” would be a stretch.
7 The meaning of “sharing” can probably be stretched to include the Maussian
pattern of giving, receiving, and reciprocating.
8 The constant improvement of open source software is due to the fact that it is
developed by a large community of programmers motivated by the
recognition they get from their peers. These programs are often as good as
proprietary ones or better.
9 He raises many valuable objections to policies currently pursued by Western
governments which already have had a significant impact on property
regimes; patents on a multitude of genomic discoveries are a case in point. I
agree with Strahilevitz (2007) that he sometimes overstates his case. If the
alternative to patents is a strategy of keeping trade secrets, a movement
away from intellectual property protection may not bring a strong new flow
of innovative applications.
10 In the 2004 Democratic primaries, Governor Howard Dean surprised the
political establishment with his skilful use of the Internet to mobilize
supporters in ways that also empowered them. This strategy was replicated
with even more success by Senator Barak Obama in 2008. In the 2007
presidential election in France, the socialist candidate Ségolène Royal used
similar tactics.
11 The website of the Center for the Study of Neuroeconomics at George Mason
University describes neuroeconomics as follows:
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“Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary research program with the goal of
building a biological model of decision making in economic environments.
Neuroeconomists ask, how does the embodied brain enable the mind (or
groups of minds) to make economic decisions? By combining techniques
from cognitive neuroscience and experimental economics we can now
watch neural activity in real time, observe how this activity depends on the
economic environment, and test hypotheses about how the emergent mind
makes economic decisions. Neuroeconomics allows us to better understand
both the wide range of heterogeneity in human behavior, and the role of
institutions as ordered extensions of our minds.”
(http://neuroeconomics.typepad.com/neuroeconomics/2003/09/neuroecono
mics_.html)
12 For an introduction to Kolm’s political economy, see Dobuzinskis (2000).
13 For a technical example of the application of these recommendations applied to
an analysis of the “return-gift game,” see Kolm (2000b).
14 Kolm revisits Vilfredo Pareto’s forgotten distinction between utilities and
“ophelimities” (Kolm 2000a, 16-23; 2006). The latter are estimations of
individuals’ material welfare, whereas the former take into account mutual
interactions: my utility is a function at the very least of your welfare, if not
in a more complex (reflexive) manner of your other-regarding utility.
Depending on whether individual i is interested in either the happiness or
welfare of others, his or her utility function can be written as ui=ui(u, x)
or ui=ui(w), where u stands for the happiness of all individuals, x
represents other relevant factors (which could include the welfare of
others), and w={wj} denotes the welfare of all individuals (and j≠i). It is
then possible to continue with utility maximization, but on the basis of
more plausible assumptions.
15 Kolm does not appeal to self-interest in trying to justify the plausibility of such
a contract but instead appeals to (a) a commonly shared sense of fairness,
(b) our capacity for impartiality, and (c) the effectiveness of dialogue in
reaching agreement over fundamental social choices (see Kolm 2005, 299-
300).
16 Although with respect to “fundamental insurance” schemes (such as health
insurance) that protect people against the occurrence of differences they
unanimously consider unfair, Kolm argues that “questions of information and
practicability lead to public implementation” (2006, 71), he remains agnostic
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regarding what sort of insurance scheme individuals may choose to bargain
for. He implies that other than sickness and lack of basic education there are
few differences which individuals will unanimously agree to be insured
against (Kolm 2005, 446).
17 Assuming, however, that a common arrangement of preferences is one in
which the preferred state of affairs consists of conditional gifts (that is, gifts
offered when others give too), legislation imposing a reciprocal contribution
(albeit not strictly speaking a gift, since gifts have to be spontaneous) might
bring about a Pareto optimum (Kolm 2000c, 180). A possible example would
be tax credits for donations to charitable organizations, insofar as they force
nondonors to compensate through their taxes for the loss of revenue to the
government.
REFERENCES
Andreoni, James. 2006. “Philanthropy.” S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds.
Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism. Vol. 2. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Benkler, Yochai. 2006. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production
Transforms Markets and Freedoms. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Callari, Antonio. 2002. “The Ghost of the Gift: The Unlikelihood of
Economics.” Mark Osteen, ed. The Question of the Gift: Essays Across
Disciplines. London: Routledge.
Derrida, Jacques. 1992. Given Time: I, Counterfeit Money. P. Kamuf, trans.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
DiZerega, Gus. 2000. Persuasion, Power and Polity: A Theory of Democratic Self-
Organization. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Dobuzinskis, Laurent. 2000. “Serge Kolm on Social Justice and the Social
Contract: A Contextual Analysis and a Critique.” The European Legacy 5, no.
5: 687-702.
Douglas, Mary. 1990. “Foreword: No Free Gifts.” In Marcel Mauss. The Gift:
The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. London: Routledge.
Gérard-Varet, L. A., S. C. Kolm, and J. Mercier Ythier, eds. 2000. The
Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. London: Macmillan.
Godbout, Jacques and Alain Caillé. 1998. The World of the Gift. D. Winkler,
138. . . C O N V E R S A T I O N S O N P H I L A N T H R O P Y
D o b u z i n s k i s
trans. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Gofman, Alexander. 1998. “A Vague but Suggestive Concept: The ‘Total Social
Fact’.” Wendy James and N.J. Allen, eds. Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute.
New York: Berghahn Books.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kaufman, Dennis A. 1991. “Self-Serving Philanthropy and Pareto Optimality.”
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 64(4): 573-590.
Kenway, Jane et al. 2006. Haunting the Knowledge Economy. London:
Routledge.
Kolm, Serge-Christophe. 1969. “The Optimal Production of Social Justice.”
J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds. Public Economics: An Analysis of Public
Production and Consumption and Their Relations to the Private Sectors.
London: Macmillan.
———. 1982. Le bonheur-liberté: Bouddhisme profond et modernité. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
———. 1996. Modern Theories of Justice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2000a. “Introduction: The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and
Altruism.” L. A. Gérard-Varet, Serge-Christophe Kolm, and Jean Mercier
Ythier, eds. The Economics of Giving, Altruism, and Reciprocity. London:
Macmillan.
———. 2000b. “The Theory of Reciprocity.” L. A. Gérard-Varet, Serge-
Christophe Kolm, and Jean Mercier Ythier, eds. The Economics of Giving,
Altruism, and Reciprocity. London: Macmillan.
———. 2000c. “The Logic of Good Social Relations.” Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics 71(2): 171-189.
———. 2005. Macrojustice: The Political Economy of Fairness. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
———. 2006. “Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism, and
Reciprocity.” Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier, eds.
Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism, and Reciprocity. Vol. 1.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Lambert, Peter. 2007. “Serge Kolm‘s ‘The Optimal Production of Social
Justice’.” Journal of Economic Inequality 5: 213-234.
Liu, Wendy and Jennifer Aaker. 2008. “The Happiness of Giving: The Time-Ask
V o l u m e V I 2 0 0 9 . . . 139
“ p h i l a n t h r o p i c o r d e r ”
Effect.” Journal of Consumer Research 35 (October): 543-557.
Mauss, Marcel. [1925] 1990. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in
Archaic Societies. W. D. Halls, trans. London: Routledge.
———. [1925] 1966. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic
Societies. I. Cunnison, trans. London: Cohen & West.
McCloskey, Deirdre. 2006. The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of
Commerce. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McMullen, Kathryn and Grant Schellenberg. 2002. Mapping the Non-Profit
Sector in Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks.
Mercier Ythier, Jean. 2006. “Introduction: The Economics of Gift-Giving: Perfect
Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth.” Serge-Christophe
Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Giving,
Altruism, and Reciprocity. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mirowski, Philip. 2001. “Refusing the Gift.” S. Cullenberg, J. Amariglio, and D.
Ruccio, eds. Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Offner, Avner. 1997. “Between the Gift and the Market: The Economy of
Regard.” Economic History Review L(3): 450-476.
Parry, Jonathan. 1986. “The Gift, the Indian Gift and the ‘Indian Gift’.” Man
21(3): 453-473.
Schuyt, Theo. 2008. “Philanthropy for Politics, Policy, Polity and the Financial
World.” Lecture at MISP, Bologna May 12, 2008.
http://www.misp.it/2008/images/stories/documenti/2008_05_12_Schuyt.pdf
Silber, Ilana. 1998. “Modern Philanthropy: Reassessing the Viability of a
Maussian Perspective.” In Wendy James and N. J. Allen, eds. Marcel Mauss:
A Centenary Tribute. New York: Berghahn Books.
Strahilevitz, Lior Jacob. 2007. “Review: The Wealth of Networks.” Yale Law
Journal 116: 1472-1516.
Testart, Alain. 1998. “Uncertainties of the ‘Obligation to Reciprocate’: A
Critique of Mauss.” Wendy James and N. J. Allen, eds. Marcel Mauss: A
Centenary Tribute. New York: Berghahn Books.
Titmuss, Richard M. 1972. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social
Policy. New York: Vintage Books.

V o l u m e V I 2 0 0 9 . . . 141
COMMENT
traditions of philanthropic order
Christine Dunn Henderson
Through a discussion of French thinkers Marcel Mauss and Serge-
Christophe Kolm, Laurent Dobuzinskis’ thoughtful paper investigates what he
calls the “philanthropic order,” a self-organizing order which originates in
individuals’ gift-giving initiatives and creates complex webs of interdependence,
obligation, and connectedness among people. Perhaps more familiarly known as
the nonprofit sector or civil society, the spontaneously arising philanthropic
order exists, as Dobuzinskis notes, “more or less precariously between the
commercial sphere and the state.” (2009, 116) Dobuzinskis defines the
philanthropic order broadly, including not merely the activities of donors and
foundations but also “a whole range of processes that allocate material and
symbolic resources through nonmarket mechanisms fuelled by more or less
explicitly altruistic motivations.” (115) Although aware of possible tensions and
conflict, Dobuzinskis nevertheless seems to understand the philanthropic order
as an essential complement to the market order, insofar as it produces and
reinforces the social capital upon which the market depends, by enabling
individuals to interact with other individuals (friends, neighbors, and even
strangers) in a manner independent of yet broadly beneficial to the economic
order and perhaps to the political one as well.
A desire to explore more completely the nature and place of the
philanthropic order in modern society leads Dobuzinskis to Mauss and Kolm.
Dobuzinskis’ discussion of Mauss’s seminal work, The Gift, highlights the triple
obligations—to give, to receive, and to reciprocate—behind gift-giving in older
(“archaic”) societies. By emphasizing the obligations at the heart of what is
often considered a purely voluntary act, Dobuzinskis reminds us that historically
what we now call philanthropic acts have sprung from complex mixtures of
selfishness and selflessness, and that self-interestedness does not “contaminate”
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the philanthropic act itself, as seems often thought today. In Mauss’s words, the
world of the gift is one in which “obligation and liberty intermingle” (Mauss
2000, 65), in that the apparently free act of gift-giving springs from a range of
motives, including senses of obligation. The urges giving rise to the
philanthropic order are not simply disinterested or altruistic, nor are those
impelling the commercial order merely selfish in any simple manner. Mauss’s
study also reminds us that customs of gift-through-exchange create “the
framework for a whole series of other exchanges, extremely diverse in scope,
ranging from bargaining to remuneration, from solicitation to pure politeness,
from out-and-out hospitality to reticence and reserve” (27). Gift exchanges frame
other exchanges, and the divide, then, between civil society and commercial
society is not as sharp as some claim.
Because Mauss’s work emphasizes reciprocal gift-giving in premodern
societies, one (even Mauss, indeed!) might conclude that the gift economy has
largely been replaced by the commercial economy in modern society. Has the
age of the gift passed, and do nonmarket exchanges today play only a marginal
role in the allocation of goods and services? Dobuzinskis is perhaps most
interested in correcting what he believes is an oversimplification of Mauss on
this point. His corrective approach to this oversimplification begins by citing
statistical indicators of current philanthropic activity as signals of the continued
or perhaps renewed importance of gift-giving in modern society. Next,
Dobuzinskis offers a very interesting discussion of the status of the philanthropic
order in a digital age. The discussion’s focus on the importance and benefits of
sharing in the world of information technology points to a robust role for
philanthropic communities in this arena. Dobuzinskis’ treatment of Open Access
sharing invites us to think more about the role of technology in the philanthropic
order and about technology’s ability to make communities out of strangers.
What are the possibilities and limits of virtual community? Are these
communities as strong as traditional communities? Stronger? And how might the
philanthropic order best harness their strength?
Perhaps with some of these questions about virtual community in the
background, Dobuzinskis wonders whether the philanthropic impulse has been
stilled by the modern age, thus returning us to earlier speculations about the
nature of that impulse and turning him from Mauss to Serge-Christophe Kolm.
Applying the analytic tools of contemporary social scientists and economists in
an effort to understand the interrelations between the spontaneous orders of
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market and philanthropy, Kolm’s work delves into the roots of the altruistic or
“gifting” disposition, emphasizing the importance of the giver’s happiness and
enlightened self-interest. Not only does Kolm bring out the range of calculation
and spontaneity involved in gift-giving, but his research also reveals how even
nakedly self-interested acts can generate interactions which yield “disinterested”
and socially beneficial results. Moreover, Kolm reminds us of the manner in
which actions—even those initially performed out of simple self-interest—can
become habitual and largely divorced from their original motives. As
Dobuzinskis notes, “even gifts offered for self-centered reasons can generate a
sequence of reciprocal actions that evolve into deeper interpersonal or social
relationships. Trust is usually built in that way, for example.” (2009, 131)
Dobuzinskis focuses on Kolm’s investigations into the complexities linking
the worlds of gift and market, and also on Kolm’s keen awareness of the subtle
mix of motives behind both apparently interested exchanges (such as economic
ones) and apparently disinterested ones (such as gifts). Drawing attention to
Kolm’s indebtedness to Adam Smith, Dobuzinskis describes Kolm’s general
project as an attempt to solve the so-called “Adam Smith problem,” or to
“combine and harmonize many of the insights Adam Smith treated separately in
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” (129) Surprisingly, however, Dobuzinskis does
not emphasize Kolm’s indebtedness to another perceptive analyst of enlightened
self-interest, Alexis de Tocqueville. Enlightened love of self, Tocqueville explains,
teaches individuals about the manner in which selfish interests can be advanced
by serving others. Americans, who Tocqueville believed had perfected this art,
“show how the enlightened love of themselves constantly brings them to aid each
other and disposes them to willingly sacrifice a part of their time and their wealth
for the good of the state” (Tocqueville 2000 [1835], 502). While Americans may
do themselves a disservice in overemphasizing the role of self-interest in their
altruism, Tocqueville praises enlightened self-interest for creating a multitude of
farsighted and moderate citizens, each ready “to sacrifice a part of his interest to
save the rest” (503). Insofar as the motive for sacrifice is self-interested, the act
may not be strictly virtuous; Tocqueville concedes this, yet he is also aware that
even self-interested acts of philanthropy create a habit of gifting which
individuals might then practice with less attention to self-interested motives.
Although Dobuzinskis does not explore the Tocquevillean roots of this
aspect of Kolm’s work, he rightly notes that both Mauss and Kolm are part of a
greater French tradition of liberalism, a tradition sadly neglected in favor of the
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statist ideologies which have dominated French intellectual life for more than a
century. Within that almost forgotten liberal tradition, three figures come to
mind as precursors of these discussions of Dobuzinskis’ philanthropic order:
Montesquieu, Constant, and Tocqueville. The discussions of “intermediary
bodies” in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws stress the need for secondary entities
as countervailing forces to centralized power and as guarantors of liberty (1990
[1748]). Montesquieu emphasizes bodies such as the aristocracy and the clergy,
but interpreting intermediary bodies more broadly reminds us of the essential
role played by private associations—including those constituting the
philanthropic order—working outside of political power within a free society.
Carrying this further, Benjamin Constant defines the existence of a civil society
as the very essence of modern liberty. For Constant, “there is a part of human
existence which necessarily remains individual and independent, and by right
beyond all political jurisdiction” (2003, 31). Modern man understands freedom
chiefly in terms of a private sphere reserved to him, in which he is free to
express his opinions, choose his religion and profession, dispose of his property,
and associate with others for whatever purposes he desires (Constant 1988, 311).
Constant recognizes that although political liberty is indeed part of modern
liberty, civil society—or to return to Dobuzinskis’ language, the philanthropic
order—may well be its flowering.
Of the French liberals, however, Tocqueville seems to provide the greatest
insight into the philanthropic order. As we have already seen, his perceptive
analysis of self-interest rightly understood sheds light on the often complex
motives behind philanthropic acts. Beyond this, Tocqueville’s writings on civic
associations offer a window into the relationship between the philanthropic
order and other orders (market, political) in a free society. Americans, writes
Tocqueville, make “constant” and “skilled” use of a vast range of civic
associations (2000 [1835], 489). The science of association, he argues, is “the
mother science” of a democratic society (492), with citizen self-government
being the school of associative life more generally. Political associations give
citizens the habit and taste for uniting for a variety of shared purposes, and
democratic citizens carry this habit well beyond their political activities. The rich
associative life within a robust civil society gives citizens a preference for doing
things themselves and for working through associations to solve problems,
rather than expecting political leaders to solve those problems for them. By
forming associations in order to tackle problems, citizens are also reminded of
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their own power. Tocqueville argues that this reminder is especially necessary in
democratic times, when individuals are more likely to feel overwhelmed and
impotent. In this sense, then, civic associations (including philanthropic ones)
serve a function akin to Montesquieu’s intermediary bodies, providing essential
protection against tyranny. “It is clear,” writes Tocqueville, “that if each citizen
… does not learn the art of uniting with those like him to defend it [his liberty],
tyranny will necessarily grow with equality” (489).
Mauss’s investigations of the gift economy in premodern societies and
Kolm’s studies of altruism do help us better understand the complex motives and
movements within the broad entity Dobuzinskis calls the philanthropic order.
But how instructive are they concerning the place of that order in a free society?
I raise this question because their advocacy of a free society seems qualified at
best. As Dobuzinskis reminds us, Mauss and Kolm begin from Hayekian
premises, in that they work within the paradigm of a spontaneous—and
private—order. In this sense they are heirs of Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and
Friedrich von Hayek, as well as of the French liberal tradition which saw some
form of private associative life as a counterforce to governmental power and as
an essential bulwark of liberty. But Mauss and Kolm draw different conclusions
from the classical liberal lines in that they look to legislation rather than
spontaneous or voluntary order to achieve their respective ends of restoring the
ethics of the gift and redistributing income. Thus Mauss and Kolm can only take
us so far, and if the philanthropic order is essential to the flourishing of
individuals and of free societies (and I believe it is), our conversation about
them should be complemented by a conversation about these earlier French and
Scottish traditions.
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putting philanthropy in order
Jack Birner
The writers of many economics textbooks state the discipline’s subject matter
as the study of what is produced for whom, and how. Curiously enough, they rarely
complete the usual list of “wh-” questions to include when and why. This is
symptomatic of the neglect by mainstream economics of time and people’s
motivations. The neglect of time—and of demography, which until about 1911 was
an integral part of every course in economics—has left economists, governments,
and private citizens insufficiently prepared for dealing with the consequences of the
aging of industrial societies. Ought the government to provide for our needs after we
have stopped working for our income? In that case we have to decide how to
redistribute the earnings and wealth that have been generated by the market,
through taxation and transfer payments by the government. Or should the provision
for old age be left up to private initiative? The latter is usually interpreted as meaning
that every individual takes care of their own pension. But the sphere of private
initiative does not stop here. Individuals may also decide to voluntarily transfer their
wealth to others without expecting anything in exchange. This is the sphere of
altruism and philanthropy, which also suffers from a lack of attention by economists.
It is therefore welcome that Laurent Dobuzinskis raises the question of how
to integrate altruism into economics (2009). He discusses the role of civil society
and its relationship to the market economy and develops the argument that a
philanthropic order essential to the welfare of individuals and to the growth and
stability of what Hayek calls the "Great Society" evolves parallel to the market
process. For his discussion of altruism he builds upon the work of Marcel Mauss,
student and son-in-law of the great French sociologist Emile Durkheim. His
analysis of the market order follows the ideas of Friedrich Hayek. All this puts
him squarely in the tradition of Adam Smith’s research program, as I will now
try to explain.
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Smith’s Research Program
Smith’s most famous book, the Wealth of Nations, looks into the causes of
economic growth. It investigates the role and functioning of both the market and
government. This is one part of Smith’s research program. The other,
complementary part, published previously in The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
analyzes civil society. This is the domain between the spheres of influence of
government and of the market. In contemporary literature it is often referred to
as social capital. The fact that Smith put the market and government together with
this intermediate domain on his research agenda makes him a pioneer. One of his
followers on this path is Durkheim. In his first book, De la division du travail
social, Durkheim turns the analysis of civil society, and what distinguishes it from
the subject matter of economics, into the foundation of sociology. This is argued
in Birner and Ege (1999), where we contrast Durkheim’s work with that of Hayek,
and in this comment I build upon what we have said there.
What is the Question?
Dobuzinkis states without further argument that the market order and the
philanthropic order are complementary. I prefer to reformulate this as the
question of the extent to which gift-giving and market transactions influence
each other either positively or negatively. An extreme way of putting this is to
ask, is it better to have a market society in which all transfer payments are
defined by law in terms of rights and obligations, or one in which they are gifts
that depend exclusively on the benevolence of individuals?
These cases are ideal types in which there is no room for civil society. In
reality we have seen that in communist regimes civil society emerged out of the
private initiatives that aimed at remedying the defects of the centrally planned
economy. These initiatives often showed market-like features. In market
economies, on the other hand, the role of government is more limited. But the
market fails to provide for everything the government does not. There remains a
set of goods and services desired by citizens that are not produced by either
government or the market. This leaves room for private initiative and
spontaneous social organizations for providing collective goods, club goods, and
goods that are transferred directly between individuals. Philanthropy belongs to
this sphere. What it does is to redistribute wealth according to the preferences
of the donors without there being any rights or obligations (other than those
stipulated in the private agreement between parties) on the part of the receivers.
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Defenders of distributive justice would like to see the sphere of transfers by
the government extended. While not necessarily opposed to private donations,
they favor the creation of rights to transfer payments for those who do not have
the means to provide for some set of goods and services that are considered to
be “basic.” At the same time they want to impose the obligation to pay for these
transfers on those who are sufficiently well-off. Such an extensive scheme of
rights-based transfers leaves less to be distributed by philanthropy. Apart from
objecting that such a system implies an intrusion on individual freedom, market
liberals such as Hayek and Friedman argue that making redistribution part of a
“bill of rights” risks undermining the incentives that make a market system
function. My assessment is that there is likely to exist an optimum mix between
the two extremes. The questions of how that mix is composed and whether it
can be optimized according to some criterion must ultimately be answered by
empirical research. Here I will raise some preliminary theoretical issues.
The Market and Philanthropy: Solutions to Different Problems?
Markets are the solution to the problem of coordination; gift giving, according to
Mauss, is an instrument that reinforces cooperation and solidarity. Society, in order
to be stable through time (or reproduce itself), needs both the coordination of the
actions of individuals and their cooperation—as Smith understood well. Hence
Dobuzinskis’ idea that the market and philanthropic orders are complementary is a
hypothesis with a respectable intellectual pedigree. Durkheim and Hayek represent
two contrary traditions within Smith’s research program. Hayek tries to explain
cooperation as arising out of market relationships. Durkheim does the reverse. Hayek
believes that cooperation works only in small groups whose members share common
objectives. As soon as the groups grow and the skills and preferences of their
members differentiate, cooperation is not enough, and the market is needed to
coordinate individual actions. It is precisely this idea that Durkheim rejects. He puts
in its stead the priority of social cohesion over market exchange and the pursuit of
self-interest, observing that without cohesion, competition (which is basic to the
functioning of the market) becomes a centrifugal force that threatens social stability.
Mauss argues that gift-giving creates solidarity. So, combining Durkheim’s and
Mauss’s ideas, philanthropy would be part of the necessary conditions for
maintaining the framework in which the market can function. Mauss’s work on gift-
giving raises general issues that can be used to clarify the relationships between
allocation through the market and through voluntary transfers.
150. . . C O N V E R S A T I O N S O N P H I L A N T H R O P Y
B i r n e r
The differences between Hayek’s and Mauss’s approaches are clearly
illustrated by their ideas on the emergence and function of credit. For Mauss,
financial credit as we know it has evolved out of a system of giving, accepting,
and reciprocating gifts that serve as a provision for the future for individuals.
Gift-giving, while creating cohesion, is not deprived of elements of self-interest.
For Hayek, on the contrary, credit is the result of the spontaneous emergence of
partial-reserve banking in a market economy. Not only did it make it possible for
individuals to permanently live beyond their means, it practically forced them to
do so, producing ever more in order to be able to pay their debts, thus making
credit one of the causes of economic growth.
For Mauss, credit and social security are closely related. A system of old-age
pensions is an integral part of the cycle of giving, receiving, and reciprocating.
In Hayek’s and Friedman’s thought, on the other hand, social security should
remain limited to a “safety net” that keeps individuals from starving if they
remain without an income. Their proposal is added to their market liberalism in
an ad hoc manner. Hayek gives no arguments why individuals who through no
fault of their own remain without an income should receive transfers to keep
them from being destitute. Friedman’s negative income tax proposal equally
lacks a solid theoretical foundation. Hayek’s proposal might be underpinned by
an appeal to a Rawlsian, veil-of-ignorance, implicit-contract model of society
(which may be why Hayek, who is averse to social-contract theorizing, did not
elaborate the issue in this direction). The link with game theory might be
pursued: the market is part of an institutional framework that keeps a repeated
positive tit-for-tat spiral of interaction going. Therefore, it is in everybody’s
interest that individuals should not be discouraged from participating in the
market process by the prospect of losing everything. A further step in this
direction would be the idea that guaranteeing individuals a minimum income
may keep them from undertaking actions that threaten the existence of the
market economy. But whatever argument one chooses, the theoretical work
remains to be done.
Transfer Payments, Entitlements, and the Law
As to pensions, Hayek and Friedman presumably leave provisions for old
age up to private initiative or consider them as being covered by the social safety
net or negative income tax. Hayek’s crusade against “social justice” may have
kept him from elaborating on these issues. At any rate, he did not deal with them
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in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1973-1979), which is about the legal framework
of the market order. Now, as Durkheim had recognized—and he even made it a
cornerstone of his theorizing—laws are the sedimentation of social norms. They fix,
and make explicit, rules of behavior that may or may not have emerged
spontaneously into a codification that starts to lead a life of its own. In Karl
Popper’s words, laws become part of World 3 (cp. for instance, Popper 1967). One
consequence of this is that they become susceptible to criticism, and hence
amelioration, an aspect that Popper emphasizes in The Open Society and Its
Enemies (1945). Hayek, on the contrary, warns against consciously meddling with
laws which are the endogenous result of a spontaneous process of social evolution.
He holds up the English system of jurisprudence, the accumulated wisdom of the
responses of individual judges to concrete cases, as an example to be followed. But
here he runs into conceptual difficulties, because he has to draw a line between
human actions and decisions that give rise to certain social norms spontaneously
and those having the express purpose of influencing norms. We may object that
purposely introduced interventions may have beneficial effects (a successful
vaccination campaign, for example), and whether these effects are intentional is a
secondary matter. Unintended consequences, on the other hand, may be disastrous.
(AIDS is a dramatic example.) There is no reason why we should accept all and any
unintended effects of individual actions as positive and condemn any consequences
of individual actions and decisions that turn out to be exactly as intended because
of the fact that their realization coincides with their planned objectives.
Let’s apply this to redistribution. For Hayek, redistribution is acceptable to
the extent that it is an unintended effect of changes in individuals’ participation
in market exchange. Where does that leave the redistribution that is the
consequence of the express philanthropic wishes of an individual? Must
philanthropy be forbidden because it has intended redistributive effects? That
would conflict with individuals’ liberty to dispose of their possessions as they
like. Or must philanthropy be allowed or even encouraged insofar as it has
beneficial unintended effects that enhance the working of the market? In order
to be consistent, Hayek would have to accept the latter while rejecting the
former. In reality, however, matters may be more complex that this. Philanthropy
has intended collective redistributive effects; if it didn’t, nobody would engage
in it. At the same time, if we accept Mauss’s idea and combine it with that of
Durkheim, philanthropy reinforces the social cohesion that is necessary for the
functioning of the market. Clearly, we have to move beyond Hayek’s framework.
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Philanthropy: Rights, Power, and Discrimination
Even if we accept that a right to receive transfer payments from private
fellow-citizens does not exist, we may still question whether it is acceptable that
an unequal distribution of gifts is entirely dependent on the whims of a Bill
Gates or a Warren Buffett. (As a matter of fact, they have limited their personal
influence by conferring their gift-destined wealth to foundations. But
foundations need statutes, so what do we write into the statutes?) A related
matter has to do with the power that comes with wealth. If certain basic
provisions of citizens become dependent on private donations, as was the case
with clientelism in ancient Rome, givers acquire more power than can be
justified, in a democratic society, by leaving everything up to private initiative.
The freedom to give what you want to whom you want is equivalent to the
power to exclude non-beneficiaries. This raises the issue of discrimination. I can
imagine that a U.S. charity that finances projects for the reduction of poverty of
young white males is more likely to be the object of critical scrutiny than one
that destines its resources to the promotion of the careers of poor black females.
Philanthropy cannot clash head-on with social norms. On the other hand,
whereas the state cannot afford even to create the impression that it
discriminates, individuals have more room for maneuver. In my example, a
successful white businessman with a poor Bronx background who founds a
charity to promote the education of poor white boys from the Bronx is less likely
to be accused of discrimination than a government agency that does the same.
Maintaining Order
An important reason why societies continue to exist is that they are
institutions in which individuals may benefit from the activities of others
without being capable of turning society to their own exclusive advantage—and
accept that this is the case: “We’re all in it together.” A stable society is
characterized by a complex texture of rights and obligations that is in some sort
of dynamic equilibrium. Let’s look for a moment at philanthropy in this light,
but now from the point of view of the individual. A rather common justification
for philanthropy is the wish of individuals to give back something to the society
that has allowed them to accumulate their wealth. This is facilitated by the fact
that the realization of this desire may come at a low cost. Normal human needs
can be satisfied with a small part of a great fortune. If money has a diminishing
marginal value, what is left has relatively little economic value to its owner. (I
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leave aside the matter of its symbolic value, which in a Maussian perspective
would deserve to be examined further.) His sacrifice is reduced even more if
society puts a premium on philanthropy in the form of tax deductibility. Even if
we accept that value is not intersubjectively comparable, this makes it
reasonable that part of an individual’s wealth is put at the disposal of others.
Whether or not this should be done through taxation and transfer payments by
the government or directly by individuals is in part a question of expediency and
not only a matter of principle.
Conclusion
So where does this leave Dobuzinskis’ idea of the spontaneous co-evolution
of philanthropy and the market? We may say that from society’s point of view
philanthropy is desirable or even necessary for two reasons. One is that, as
Mauss argued, it creates a system of mutual commitments that are an important
ingredient of the cement of society (Smith’s civil society). A link between giving
and social cohesion that Mauss did not pursue is the psychological finding that
giving creates a dependency effect on the giver rather than the receiver.
Economists might translate this into their jargon by saying that philanthropy
augments the utility of the giver, but more typically they will see the relationship
between giver and receiver in terms of a decrease in the utility of the former and
an increase in the utility of the latter. This contrasts with the result of
psychological research just mentioned and reinforces Mauss’s case over the
rather poor motivational framework of traditional economics. Fortunately,
experimental economics is making rapid progress here.
The second argument is that philanthropy helps fill the gaps between the
fields of influence of the market and of government that inevitably remain in a
complex society. Popper’s argument referred to above, analyzing both the
imposed and the spontaneous rules of the philanthropic order and codifying
them into laws helps us define the relationships between these three spheres and
improve their relative contributions to the well-being of citizens and to social
stability. The analysis of the legal framework of philanthropy deserves a
theoretical effort comparable to what Hayek did for the market order in Law,
Legislation, and Liberty. Trying to improve on Mauss’s rather naive ideas about
the role of government in philanthropy and concentrating on the relationships
between philanthropy and the market, as Dobuzinskis does, are important
contributions to Adam Smith’s research program.
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COMMENT
the philanthropic or gift order
Jacques T. Godbout
I first wish to thank Lenore Ealy for the opportunity to comment briefly on
Laurent Dobuzinskis’ stimulating paper. The author shows that most analysts,
including Hayek, consider Mauss’s analysis, and the gift phenomenon in
general, to apply primarily to archaic societies. “Gifts exist only at the margin of
the market economy” (Dobuzinskis 2009, 119).
Furthermore, when it does apply to present-day societies, it is defined as
disinterested, nonreciprocal, acts.
What the Maussian movement (MAUSS, an acronym for Mouvement anti-
utilitariste dans les sciences sociales)1 first attempted to show is that Mauss’s
vision of the gift very much applies to modern society. This is the main thesis in
our book, The World of the Gift, first published in French in 1992. The gift here is
an order that is both spontaneous and modern. (I prefer “gift” to “philanthropic”
order. Philanthropy is simply one type within the “gift order.”) The market order
itself rests in part on this order, if only because the gift feeds trust, a necessary
ingredient of the Hayekian catallaxy (Dobuzinskis 2009, 122). This is why we
don’t think of the gift as first and foremost an economic order, although its
economic dimension is important and increasingly so in an information economy
with phenomena such as open source and “copyleft” (124). The gift is not only a
gift economy (130), and the gift and economic orders are not always, and not
necessarily, antagonistic. Let me try to briefly develop these points.
First what is this phenomenon we call “the gift”? In Western societies it is
generally defined both formally and legally as a nonreciprocal, unilateral
transfer. Something goes from A to B, with nothing from B to A or to anyone
else. For someone wishing to study the phenomenon, it comes as a surprise—
and a malaise—to find that this definition almost never applies. When one
follows what we can call the “chain of the gift”—presents, hospitality, services,
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and even the most apparently unilateral gifts of blood, organs, volunteerism, and
philanthropy—one finds a general circulation of things quite in opposition to the
definition. This is so much the case that the common saying “What goes around
comes around” (and its equivalent in many languages) is the way in which many
people define the gift, and it seems to have the status of a social law.
The more one gives, in fact, the more one receives. But there is a caveat. This
does not mean that the giver’s motivation is to receive, that his objective is to get
something in return. One must not confound the intention with the material
transfer. In fact, it is the opposite. The story goes that the less we give with the
intention to receive, the more we receive. This is the primary paradox of the gift
paradigm: the more we give, the more we receive, subject to the condition that
we do not give for that purpose! But it must be added that even when we do give
to receive, the paradigm holds. Merchants know this well. And even in this case,
when everyone knows that their “present” is purely instrumental, the paradigm
still holds; less than if the intention is altruistic, but it holds.
It is not a comfortable conclusion for an economist, but there seems to exist
a fundamental tendency to give when a gift is received. Not necessarily to give
back, not to give the equivalent, but to give. This is the observation. It is the
general rule, a driving social force, a spring for individual action. Homo
economicus is not alone; he shares the social order with Homo donator. Within
the market order, this spring is replaced by interest. Self-interest is without a
doubt an important motivational force for human action, one that possesses a
great privilege, and this privilege is that it is self-evident. But the “lure of the
gift” is as strong as the lure of gain (l’appât du gain). This is simply not
recognized, not self-evident in our society; it must be demonstrated (Godbout
2007). The generality of this phenomenon is of course impossible to show here.
Let me just give an extreme example, for a kind of gift commonly thought to be
unilateral. When a philanthropic organization sends letters of solicitation to their
“generous donors,” it often accompanies these with symbolic presents. Why?
Because even a small and purely symbolic (and instrumental) present activates
this impulse to give. “The American Disabled Veterans organization reports . . .
that when the mailing includes an unsolicited gift (. . . individualized address
labels) the success rate nearly doubles” (Cialdini 2001, 30).
Kolm, like so many others, tries to explain it through motivations and
sentiments of all kinds: “fairness, equity, . . . moral indebtedness” (Dobuzinskis
2009, 129). All of this is true. But I strongly believe that explanations like this
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are, and will always be, ultimately unsatisfying. Why? Because, as Hénaff puts
it, “the gift relationship possesses the astonishing power of instituting a link
stronger than sentiments” (2002, 197). As Cialdini notes, “There is a strong
cultural pressure to reciprocate a gift, even an unwanted one” (2001, 33). Only
cultural? It is surely reinforced by cultural and social factors, but recent research
in cognitive science shows a possible genetic foundation (Judson 2007).
At the end of his essay, Mauss describes the gift phenomenon as “this
fleeting moment when a society holds” (“l’instant fugitif où la société prend,”)
(2007, 243). Like a handmade mayonnaise, we do not know exactly why the
elements cohere or do not. We must accept it as a fact, as economists accept self-
interest: when something is received as a gift by a human being, it produces an
invitation to give in return. It is of course a source of profound astonishment for
those applying the homo economicus paradigm: the model predicts that in such
a situation, the agent should, and in fact will, take advantage. Most people, most
of the time, do not.
So what is a gift? “A gift is a non-contracted good” (Stark and Falk 1998,
272). This simple definition by an economist is an interesting starting point
because it does not specify whether the good is unilateral. But it does specify
that should there be a return, it will be free. At least legally. This freedom,
however, is not absolute; it is regulated, but not by a contract. What circulates
is regulated by the quality and the intensity of the relationship between social
agents. The gift feeds this relationship. The gift is then what circulates between
human beings as a result of the dynamic of their social ties, in opposition to
what circulates on the principle of rights or the logic of market self-interest,
which are both ideally free from such ties.
How does this work? First, how does it not work? As we have seen, it is not
“pure” (Dobuzinskis 2009, 120) in the sense of being in principle unilateral. Gift-
giving is a relationship rather than an individual beau geste. Pure, unilateral
altruism is not the ideal gift. Incidentally, for those familiar with the prisoner’s
dilemma, it is interesting to observe that two altruists do not solve the dilemma
with any more facility than two egoists motivated by self-interest only (Godbout
2007, 259-276). In the gift paradigm, the normal gift is reciprocated. If and when
a “pure” gift is given, one not meant to be reciprocated, it creates a significant
problem for the recipient. He is often humiliated; but worse, his impulse to give
back is blocked. This does not mean that altruism does not exist. What it means
is that altruistic motivation is often not pure, but mixed. And above all, it means
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that altruists do receive: the more one gives altruistically (without the intention
to receive), the more one receives.
In fact, what the gift model illustrates is the gift’s dark side. Surprisingly, the
dark aspect is on the recipient’s side. The recipient is entirely dependent on the
donor: he has no voice of his own. This is why the state is often a better system
of circulation of services, because it can accord rights to recipients, in direct
opposition to principles of charity and philanthropy. The gift’s order or system, in
other words, is different from that of the state. Incidentally, Mauss did not write that
the state was “the only way for modern societies to recover the social bonds he
observed in archaic societies” (Dobuzinskis 2009, 127). As Dobuzinskis remarks,
“in fairness, Mauss showed a marked preference for . . . associations” (122).
From that point of view, gift-giving is closer to the market than to the state
system. The gift order and the state order do not always mesh. As Goodin writes,
“The more government takes the place of associations, the more will individuals
lose the idea of forming associations and need government to come to their
help” (1993, 64). But the state can be superior to the gift. An interesting
question here, and an increasingly important one, is just when the state is
preferable and when a philanthropic association is better. The question
highlights the limits of the gift model: that the recipient has no standing. This
dark side of the gift explains why the recipient is often better off as a client (with
bargaining power) or as a citizen (with political power in democratic rights).
This being said, what, then, are the elements of the homo donator
paradigm? They clearly can’t be laid out here, but to sketch an outline (and
maybe spur curiosity): the gift model is based on a very peculiar notion of debt,
far from the equivalence principle; the gift affects the identity of the agents;
agents must infringe on the rules for their gifts to be “true.” One meta-rule of
the gift is indeed that escape from the rule is necessary in order for the actors to
express the freedom inherent in the gesture. All of the gift’s partners affirm that
the more closely social rules are obeyed, the narrower the gesture and the less
the gift can be said to be “true” or “real.” So gift givers are always playing with
the rules, and this leads to the well-known problem of excess characteristic to
the gift. It may seem strange, but is it so different from the market experience
where each agent tries to “beat the market”?
I agree that the gift is not a “fully developed paradigm” (Dobuzinskis 2009,
116). It is also true that “there are interesting parallels between Mauss’s
paradigm and Hayek’s idea of the spontaneous order” (121). The gift paradigm
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is a spontaneous social order. One can even add that since both are based on
principles of the network and, within that, mutual autonomous adjustments,
rather than hierarchy and authority, they are more similar to each other than to
the state and its bureaucracy. In Mary Douglas’s words, “Like the market, it
supplies each individual with personal incentives to collaborate” (121). But this
spontaneous order is not often acknowledged by economists, except at a purely
theoretical level. As Frank notes, “Most [economic] texts mention at the outset
that our rational choice model takes people’s taste as given. They may be
altruists, sadists, masochists; or they may be concerned solely with advancing
their own material interests. But having said that, most texts then proceed to
ignore all motives other than material self-interest” (1994, xxiii). They often also
admit that this spring of action exists for themselves. Even Hayek wrote in his
preface to The Road to Serfdom (1944), “I am as certain as anyone can be that the
beliefs set out in [this book] are not determined by my personal interests. . . . I
have come to regard the writing of this book as a duty which I must not evade.”
NOTES
1 Primarily francophone, as writes the author, but not only. Our journal
(La revue du MAUSS) is also published in Portuguese (Brazil) and Italian.
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